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CHAPTER I. 
THE PROBLEM STATED : AN OVERVIEW 
The primary focus of this thesis is to analyze an international or-
ganization (IFATCA) in its role in the international community . Of 
specific interest to this study will be an examination of the theories 
of linkage and complex interdependence . These two theories , which will 
be covered in detail in an ensuing section , will be viewed from the per-
spective of IFATCA ' s role in the international environment . 
My analysis will consist of a simple profile of this organization , 
in order to determine " typology", accompanied by a case study of a con-
flict issue with which IFATCA has had to deal . The case study under 
analysis will be the PATCO strike / walk-out of 1981 . 
The importance of air traffic controllers , along with their repre-
sentative organizations , has been under-rated in the larger picture of 
air travel . In the summer of 1981, a strike/walk-out by the Professional 
Air Traffic Controllers ' Organization (PATCO) , in the United States , 
dramatically portrayed the importance of air traffic controllers in air 
travel not only in this country , but also in the international environ-
ment . The ramifications of the PATCO action were most prominent in two 
areas : air safety and economics . Analysts and critics of the action 
claimed that the PATCO strike diminished airline revenues while lowering 
the safety levels of air transport , in general . The PATCO strike also 
2 
caused conflict in many other nation-states where air traffic controller 
union action was taken either in sympathy for PATCO , or to protest the 
lower safety levels . These actions , resulting from the linkage actions 
of IFATCA , will be the subject of my inquiry. 
Introduction to Linkage and Complex Interdependence : A Literature Survey 
In recent years , a new school of thought has emerged among students 
of international relations . This new theory is that of "complex inter-
dependence" among nations . This theory , which subscribes to an interna-
tional environment in which nations are "linked" together either econom-
ically, politically, or ideologically, holds as its "corner-stone" the 
sub-theory of " issue-linkage", among nations , and the subsequent build-
ing of "international regimes " to organize these "linkages " and prose-
cute various issues . 
Attempts to define and study complex interdependence have increased 
markedly , as of late . Certain prominent political scientists have laid 
the "groundwork " for categorization and study of this "comples inter-
dependence" in the international community . Stanley Hoffman , of Harvard 
University , etched the parameters of this new field in his work , " Inter-
national Relations :· The Long Road to Theory" , in 1959 .
1 
Some eighteen 
years later , one of Hoffman ' s fonner colleagues at Harvard , Joseph Nye 
along with Robert Koehane , a student of Hoffman ' s , wrote Power and Inter-
dependence : World Politics in Transition .
2 
This study incorporated 
Hoffman ' s foundation and applied it to the new theory of "complex inter-
1world Politics 4 (April 1959) : 346-377 . 
2Boston : Little , Brown and Co ., 1977 . 
3 
dependence". The following statement from their book gives the "flavor" 
of this new philosophy: "To a greater or lesser extent , a nwnber of 
scholars see our era as one in which the territorial state, which has 
been dominant in world politics for the four centuries since fuedal times 
ended , is being eclipsed by nonterritorial actors such as multinational 
corporations , transnational social movements , and international organiza-
tions . 113 Keohane and Nye .included thernsel ves among these scholars who 
see the emergence of this new trend of interdependence in world affairs . 
Complex interdependence, defined, holds an international environ-
ment in which nation-states and international non-governmental actors 
(such as IFATCA and MNCs) have become integrated by virtue of the com-
plexities of the international market-place and international issues . 
Johan Galtung, in The True Worlds: !:_Transnational Perspective, placed 
the concept of complex interdependence into theoretical format in his 
4 ''dependencia" theory. Basically, Galtung felt that each nation in the 
international setting is composed of a center (encompassing the country ' s 
governing elite), and the periphery (encompassing the country ' s largely 
disenfranchised masses). Galtung stated that there is haI.111ony (interde-
pendence) between the centers of various nations. This harmony, he 
claimed, was fostered to repress, dominate and exploit the periphery , or 
the masses. 5 Whil e this theory exudes a Marxist approach to internation-
al interdependence, it further demonstrates the work that has come from 
3Robert o. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye , Power and Interdependence : 
~Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co ., 1977), p . 3 . 
4Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New 
York : The Free Press,"1:98(5'):"""" 
5
Ibid., pp. 119-123 
4 
the concept of complex interdependence . 
Still, though , most political scientists had tied the id a of com-
plex interdependence to one of nation-state integration largely over-
looking Non-goverrunental Organizations (NCOs) and indigenous n tional 
actors (citizens , nation-based interest groups, etc.) . James N. 
Rosenau , In The Study Of Global Interdependence 1 Essays .2!!. the Tunsna-
tionalization of World Affairs, enlarged the parameters of the study of 
interdependence with his theory of "transnationalization" of world af-
f . 6 R f airs . osenau elt that interdependence , as a concept , was "so broad 
that often it is used to analyze circumstances and conditions in the 
7 physical world that shape and limit the course of hwnan events ." 
Rosenau felt this type of study to be stagnant and felt a new direction 
in complex interdependence study needed to be enacted . This new concept , 
"transnational relations" was seen by Rosenau as encompassing a "dynam-
ic process initiated and sustained by people ." He further stated that 
this concept " serves to stress a concern with those aspects of mounting 
interdependence tha t extend beyond changing physical realities into the 
realms of ind i vidual experience , collective endeavor , and group inter-
action ."8 Ros enau defined "transnational theory" as such : " ••• the 
processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have 
been supplemented by relations among private individuals , groups and 
societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of 
6 James N. Rosenau , In The Study Of Global Interdependence : . Essays 
on the Transnationalization of World Affairs (London : Frances Pinter , 
1980) . - ---
7
Ibid ., p . 1 
8Ibid . 
5 
9 
events•" This new conceptualization by Ros n u op n d th fi ld o r -
search in complex interdependence th ory to ncomp ss 11 po nti 1 in-
ternational actors . 
Another " school" of political scientists, working long th sam 
lines as these scholars, embarked upon a subfi ld of compl x int rd -
pendence theory . This subfield dealt with th cone pts of issu -l'nk ge 
and regime-building . Defined, issue-linkag , on th int rn tion 1 seen , 
describes a condition whereby international actors (ICOs, COs, MNOs) 
enter into a relationship over a common issue, and int rnation 1 re-
gimes can result. Ernest B. Haas, in "Why Coll bor t : Issu -Linkag 
and International Regimes"lO defined regim s as "norms, rul s and pro-
cedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue area • ., ll Haas has stud-
ied international regimes in order to broadly categorize typ s and to 
develop a solid principle for study of these organizations . Haas pro-
posed that the first order of regime-building is to stablish the norms, 
rules and procedures the regime is to follow . Th conference , which is 
commonly held to determine these is , according to Haas, the focal point 
of study in determining a regime's character. Haas giv s four types of 
regime conferences. 
(1) If the negotiating conference is characterized by eclecticism, 
issues will be linked exclusively in a tactical manner . The 
credibility of the linkage is largely a function of the will 
and the ability of key parties to impose it, including the ma-
10world Politics 14 (April 1980) : 357-405 . 
11
Ibid., p. 358. 
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nipulation of technical information . It is unlik ly hat a r -
gime will emerge; if it does, it will not outlive th first im-
portant technological innovation . 
(2) If the negotiating conference is dominated by the rational mode , 
substantive issue-linkage on the basis of agre d doctrin s will 
prevail. Power differentials among states are not important as 
mediating instruments . The resulting regim will be as stabl 
as the doctrinal consensus on which it rests . 
(3) If the negotiators are skeptics, fragmented issu -linkage will 
prevail, and the will and capability of powerful states can be 
expected to remain important as instrumentalities for rewarding 
coalition partners and paying off opponents . The resulting re-
gime will be weak and unstable . 
(4) If the negotiators ar~ pragmatists , they will first attempt sub-
stantive issue-linkage and withdraw to fragmented linkage when 
this becomes politic . State power is a factor in reaching an 
agreement, but not an essential one . The resulting regime , 
though including fewer issues than had been hoped , will never-
theless be fairly stable . It will also be capable of being 
adapted and adjusted so as to include additional issues later .
12 
Once a regime's foundation has been set , Haas states the regime can 
then be placed into a typological framework based on the regime's per-
formance . This typology, as proposed by Haas , is as follows (Figure I , 
on the following page) . 
12Ibid., p . 386 . 
7 
Procedures · Rules 
Share Iner ase 
Information Knowledge 
Common Framework yes (1) no no 
Joint Facility yes yes (2) no 
Common Policy yes yes (3) yes (4) 
Single Policy yes yes y s (5) 
Figure I. T f R . a ypes o eg1mes 
~rnest B. Haas , "Why Collaborate", p . 401. 
Out of this typology come five basic r gim typ s, according to 
Haas. In Type 1, actors proceeding within a common fram work ng g 
essentially in collecting and exchanging information. Th ir pooling o · 
information is supplemented with technical assistanc from th b tter-
to the poorer-endowed countries when existing capabilities are un v nly 
distributed among the members . Type 2 regimes force the actors to 
choose a joint facility if they wish to do more than share information . 
If they so choose , information is not only pool d, but new information 
requested , and the substantive area of concern, is subjected to stand-
ardized monitoring procedures . The standardization of information proc-
essing amounts to "shaping" the information into accepted bodies of 
knowledge used in making policies . If capabiliti s are unevenly dis-
tributed , the richer are expected to aid the poorer by allocating a dis-
proportionate share of common resources to them . Allocation implies 
that joint action is " scheduled"; there has to be some understanding on 
who is to give whom how much before the activity can b carried out ef-
fectively . 
A common policy also requires the sharing of information and the 
8 
increasing of knowledge . In addition, it carri s with i t und rst nd i ngs 
that each actor will seek to obtain a desir bl outcom by c rt in 
time . The outcome i's decided collectively, but ch par icip nt remains 
in charge of implementing the decision . In Type 3, th ctors realiz 
that one way of accomplishing this involves for casting without setting 
targets for achievement . The collective forecasting of th fu ure is an 
exercise in increasing knowledge , but the forecasts n ed not call for 
action . In Type 4, if action is desired by the actors, th results o 
the forecasts are translated into targets for each of th participants . 
Targeting without forecasting and the sharing of information is not con-
ceivable. In the final type of regime , Type 5, the actors enter into 
single policy for a set of states that presupposes all of the abov , 
plus commitment to a firm plan of action which is implement d by the 
1 
. . . 13 centra organization . 
In concluding , Haas delineated two schools of thought concerning 
linkages and regime- building . In the first school , structuralists 
stress the role of hegemonial states - of power - in the creation and 
maintenance of regimes . The second school of thought on these theories 
were termed "evolutionary holists" by Haas . Other political scientists 
group these individuals under the heading of "cognitives". These indi-
victuals , in opposition to structuralists , stress both the fact of per-
ceptual change and the need for further changes . Desirable changes can 
. 14 H be specified in accordance with this teleological dynamic . aas con-
13Ibid ., p . 401. 
14Ibid ., pp . 359- 360 . 
9 
sidered himself to be a synthesis of th ~·o h .. ,. j OW V r 1 t r vi wing his 
model, one might deduce that Haas is more structur list th n cognitiv , 
in his view of linkage and regime-building . 
James N. Rosenau, a catalyst of political sci nc thought, nt rd 
into his own study of linkage in Linkage Politics: Ess ys.2D. .!:h_ Conv r-
gence of National and International Systems. 15 As will b shown , 
Rosenau ' s study is somewhat of an antithesis to H s '. As such, Ros n u ' s 
work places him within the confines of the cogni iv school . 
Rosenau ' s book is an amalgam of articles nd authors v rsed on ~h 
intracacies of linkage. The various articles stud· d th cross-n tion-
al effect of many issues along with the pres nc of link g s surrounding 
these issues . Rosenau , at the outset, defined link ge broadly " s our 
basic unit of analysis , defining it as any recurrent s quence of b hav-
ior that originates in one system and is reacted to in anoth r ." 
Rosenau further characterized linkage as having two compon nts p rts: 
inputs and outputs . Polity outputs were used by Rosenau to describ s -
quences of behavior that originate within one political system and 
either culminate in , or are sustained by, tha environment . If thes 
outputs survived, and were transmitted to another system such that fur-
ther sequences of behavior were spawned by this output, then this ph -
homenon was characterized by Rosenau as environment inputs . On the 
' other side of the coin ', if an external system gave rise to a sequence 
of behavior which either culminated in , or was sustained by th system , 
Rosenau claimed this constituted environmental outputs . If this behav-
15 
New York : The Free Press , 1969 . 
10 
i or is t hen transmitted to the original syst m, in hls th ory r ns-
ferral was termed pol ity inputs . 16 
Rosenau, in a loose framework , envision d th -c t gory typolo-
gy f or regimes, or linkage-proces ses ( as Rosen u dubb d th m) . Th first 
cat egory was referred to as pene t ra tive process which occurr wh n m m-
bers of one system serve as par ti cipants in th politic l process o n-
other . One type of situation, under t his typology , would b th t of n 
occupying army . The second category was ref rred to s r ctiv proc-
ess. ihis situation envisions a s ys tem that enfuses outputs into an-
other system but does not actively par ticipate one th output h d b n 
accepted, and the former does not reac t t o the respons of the 1 tter to 
t his output. The final category was r eferred to as n emulative proc-
ess. In this situation, outputs by one system are responded to by an-
other ·system by emulating behavior . 17 This type of linkage has been 
used by some political scientists to explain the proliferation of coups 
in third world countries . 
In any event , Rosenau ' s framework conceptualized a weak , indeed 
almost non-existent , regime-building ne twork . Rosenau , through this 
model, seemed to intimate that once the s tructure of organization (either 
governmental or non-governmental) was removed from linkage , regime 
structure became weak and diffuse . 
Rosenau ' s inclusion of other ac t ors in linkage has given birth to 
other studies of linkage . Kay Lawson , Political Parties and Linkage : ! 
16
Ibid ., p . 45 . 
17Ibid ., p . 46 . 
J 
11 
C t . p . 18 ompara ive erpsective , s tudied linkag on th n ion-st t 1 v 1 s 
it occurred in relation to party politics . Ind d , L wson t ribu 
Rosenau's widened perspective to her study o h in r ction (links) 
be tween citizens and poli t ical leaders . Lawson st t s th whil 
Ros enau "discuss(ed) the interact i on ... h n v r s iz s upon th s m-
ingl y obvious opportunity t o f i t t hi s study into th w"d r p rsp ctiv 
of linkage studies • .,l9 Lawson, naturally, seized th opportuni y nd 
produced an accumulated text on the numerous typ s nd s yl s o link-
age between the citizen and the party, on t he nation 1 1 v 1 . 
In concluding, while there are many conflicting schools of thought 
on the theories of complex interdependence and linkage , I plac th most 
credence in the structuralist theories . Keohan and Ny •s vi w of com-
plex interdependence and Ernest Haas's view of linkage , b c us of th 
basically positive nature of their models, ar e t h on s I beli v r -
fleet the true nature of the "international community". 
International Aviation Litera ure Review 
The subject of commercial air travel has come of age as a r sult of 
the technological advances in World War II . Such innovations as j pro -
pulsion engines and large "payload" aircraft made economically f asibl 
conunercial air travel. The post-World War I I international market- place 
became increasingly complex and inter-connected. This solidified inter-
national market-place required increased internationa l transport of both 
passengers and cargo. The vital importance of air transport was giv n 
18
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. 
19
Ibid., p. 7. 
12 
world-wide coverage in 1948 , when the United St t s w s ore d t o im-
port millions of tons of cargo into blockaded B t'lin . This " "r 
bridge" has been heralded as the start of commercial ir tr nspor nd 
travel . 
Even before World War II , political scientists r liz d th impor-
tance of international aviation . In 1930 , Kenneth W. Col grov , Pro-
fessor of Political Science at Northwestern University , publish d 
thesi s on the ramifications of international aviation for the World 
Peace Foundation . His book, International Control of Aviation , propos d 
the establishment of international norms and guidelines to standardiz 
international aviation. Even though air traffic control was in its in-
fancy, Colegrove proposed that air lanes and callsigns b standardized 
. . l l l 20 on an internationa e~e • 
As commercial airlines grew , so did literature concerning their op-
eration and politics. David Corbett, an Associate Professor of Politi-
cal Science at the Australian National University, published Politics 
and the Airlines, in 1965. Corbett's study concerned the policies and 
procedures governing airlines in five countries : Australia , Britain , 
Canada, India and the United States. Three of the five countries Corbett 
studied had much in common. Australia, Britain and Canada , all common-
wealth countries, aside from having conunon governmental institutions and 
processes , also had public ownership of the airlines . This study , while 
weak in studying the composite international system, did an excellent 
job of comparing and contrasting systems of public vs . private owner-
20Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965 . 
13 
ship of airlines and the policies which spring forth rom such ys ms . 
Most recently, Betsy Gidwitz produced an ind pth study of th poli-
tics surrounding international air transport . H r book , Th Politics .2._ 
International Air Transport, while covering most of Corb t ' s work lso 
incorporated history , structures , and processes on a composit l v 1 . 
Gidwitz stated the purpose of her book was to examin th v rious poli -
ical forces influencing the international air-transport industry and 
to clarify the interaction between these forces and differ nt compon nts 
of the industry. While air traffic control received some cov rag , th 
majority of policies and problems inherent in air traffic control w r 
1 k . 21 ac ing. 
The study of various international aviation organiz tions h s gain d 
in popularity in recent years. The International Air Transport As so-
ciation (IATA) has gained the most popularity in political scienc works . 
Richard Y. Chuang, in 1972, wrote The International Air Transport Asso-
ciation : A Case Study of~ Quasi-Governmental Organization. Chuang ' s 
book was primarily a profile of IATA with a short coverage of the out-
. . 22 puts and philosophies of the organization. 
J .w.s. Brancker, some five years later, published a more definitive 
study of the policies and processes of IATA . However , since Brancker 
was intimately involved with IATA, having served on one of its boards , 
his book tends to present IATA in a highly positive tone . His book , 
while a complete survey of IATA's policies and processes , presents a 
21Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co ., 1980 . 
22Leiden, Netherlands : A.W. Sijthoff, 1972 . 
14 
slanted view which detracts from its overall eff · 23 Ctlv n ss . 
Young W. Kihl, in 1971, published a work profiling and x mining 
the p~litical processes of the International Civil Avi ion Organ ' z tion 
(ICA0). 24 K'hl' k 
i s wor encompassed a profile of th org nization fol-
lowed by three case studies of conflict issues with which !CAO has ha to 
deal in recent times. The ob ject of the ICAO study was to xamin th 
role of an Inter-Governmental Organiza tion (IGO) in the settlem n of 
each of the three conflict issues studied. Kihl ' s study was us d x-
tensively by this author in organizing his work . 
The nature and problems of air traffic control began to grow in 
prominence after World War II with the increase in international air 
transport. Although private-sector corpora tions worked furiously on 
machinery to relieve the over-burdened controller, and various national 
governmental agencies, world-wide, worked to develop more standard iz d 
policies and procedures for air traffic control, little discussion o 
the politics involved with air traffic contro l surfaced . Milton G. 
White, operating under the James Jackson Cabot Professorship of Air 
Traffic Regulation and Air Transportation at Norwich University , gave 
a lecture, and subsequently published a book, concerning the problems 
25 
and bottle-necks in the future of air traffic control. White felt 
that procedures, especially concerning the use of radar , would have to 
23
Leiden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977. 
24Young w. Kihl, Conflict Issues and International Civil Aviation 
f D 1971). Decisions: Three Cases (Denver: University o enver , ------
25The Relation of Radar and Corrununication E£ the Future of Aviation 
(Norwic~Vermont: Norwich University, 1947). 
15 
eventually occur due to increasing demands for ai'r space by conunercial , 
as well as private citizen pilots. White stated, "The eventual limit 
to which commercial and private aviation can rise is very much deter-
mined by the amount and form of information avaliable to the pilot . 
This precipitous drop in airport efficiency is caused by low visibility , 
which denies to the pilot and control tower most of the information nor-
mally available on a clear day. (As such) night and bad weather flying 
must receive a satisfactory solution before the Age of Air wi ll truly 
be with us. 1126 Thus, the controller position was seen as crucial to the 
future of air transport. 
Since White's study, little has been written about the politics and 
implications of air traffic control to international aviation . However, 
early last year Christer Jonsson published an article deal ing with hol-
istic aspects of the politics of international relations (IR) perspec-
1. k 27 tive which utilized the concepts of complex interdependence and in age . 
Jonsson sunnised that "the development of international aviation seems 
to conform with overall global trends toward increasing interdependence . 
Following Keohane and Nye, "complex interdependence" can be understood 
as an "ideal-type" condition under which actors other than states par-
ticipate directly in international politics, a clear hierarchy of issues 
International does not exist, and military force plays a minor role . 
28 
· 'd 1 type ." air transport has indeed evolved in the direction of this 1 ea 
26
Ibi' d ., p. 12. 
27 . the politics of internation-
Christer Jonsson, "Sphere of flying: 2 
al aviation", International Organization 12 (Spring 1981)' 
271
-
30 
' 
28 
Ibid., pp. 290-292. 
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The study which I propose follows Jonsson ' s seen rio . Op r ting 
out of this "ideal environment" I will examine a compon nt p rt o th 
system of international aviation, the international air tr f fic control-
lers. Jonsson's article, while explaining the important conn ct on b -
t ween international aviation and complex interdependence, did not touch 
upon the politics and problems of air traffic control . In light of h 
recent PATCO strike, study of the process es and political role of air 
traffic control, internationally, is a must . This perceiv d n d , and 
the "virgin" quality of this area of international avi tion , mo iv ted 
this work. 
17 
CHAPTER II. 
PROFILE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC 
CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS (IFATCA) 
Introduction 
"The objects and problems of Air Traffic Control are generally the 
same all over the world. They can be mastered only by international co-
operation, mutual understanding and an exchange of ideas and experi-
ences. 
It is fitting, therefore, that Air Traffic Controllers of all na-
tions should unite in a world-wide professional federation, which is 
based on the principle of co-operation in all professional matters. 1129 
As shown, the aforementioned preamble to the Constitution of IFATCA 
characterizes the Association as an international organization construct-
ed to achieve certain objectives. These objectives will be stated later 
in this thesis; however, it is important to note that IFATCA is an or-
ganization which operates in the international community. 
In order to "set the stage" for IFATCA's role in the international 
community, it must first be determined what type of organization IFATCA 
encompasses. To .determine typology, the functions and duties of the 
Association must be determined through a study of its institutions and 
2911Preamble of the Constitution of the International Federation of 
Air Traffic Controllers• Associations", IFATCA Manual (Geneva, Switzer-
land: IFATCA, 1980-1981). 
18 
processes. Of primary importance, to this typology, is an international 
characterization of IFATCA. 
Students of international politics recognize three broad categories 
of actors which operate in the international environment: Inter-govern-
mental Organizations (IGOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and 
Multinational (Business) Organizations (MNOs). In order to determine 
IFATCA's character, and thence develop a plan with which to study this 
organization, it must first be determined which category IFATCA falls. 
Inter-Governmental Organizations 
IGOs are a subset of international organizations which have as 
their membership the sovereign and independent nation-states in the 
world. The states are represented in IGOs by the delegation of the 
governmental agencies of individual member states. IGOs are estab-
lished to perform a specific task (such as standardizing practices of 
air navigation, weather forecasting, epidemic control, etc.). The ob-
jectives of IGOs are stated clearly in the constitutional document of 
30 the organization which is adopted as a multilateral agreement. 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
NGOs, a second subset of international organizations, have as their 
membership private-sector nation-based organizations such as trade and 
labor unions and organizations as well as some private enterprises. 
NGOs are established to address certain individual issues and/or objec-
tives which are generally set, and agreed to, in the form of a consti-
3oYoung w. Kihl, "Learning Package Material for Political Science 
453" class syllabus, Iowa State University, Ames, Spring 1980. 
19 
tutional document. 
NGOs, as a result of their non-governmental membership, are gener-
ally not as powerful as the IGOs, and are not nearly as effective in 
reaching their organizational goals. 
Multinational Organizations 
MNOs, the third subset of international organizations, are defined 
by the United Nations as "organizations which own or control production, 
or service facilities, in two or more countries other than the one in 
which it is based ... 3l MNOs are organized, generally, for one purpose: 
profit. It is this motivation which is the primary objective of the 
MNO. MNOs are, as a rule, controlled by a ruling board of directors 
with a corporate secretariat as its governing mechanism. 
What makes IFATCA interesting, as an organization, is that it is 
composed of labor unions, as well as trade associations, from various 
nations. IFATCA, as such, is an NGO, although the dual composition of 
the membership - labor and trade associations - makes it somewhat differ-
ent from other NGOs. NGOs are established; primarily, to address cer- . 
tain objectives of the individual membership; i.e. their wants and 
needs. IFATCA, as an NGO, is not different from others in this regard. 
Contained within the IFATCA Constitution, for instance, is a set of sev-
en objectives to be promoted by the organization. They are: 
(a) to operate as a non-profit and non-political federation of air 
traffic controllers' associations; 
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(b) to promote safety, efficiency and regularity in International 
Air Navigation; 
(c) to assist and advise in the development of safe and orderly sys-
tems of Air Traffic Control; 
(d) to promote and uphold a high standard of knowledge and profes-
sional efficiency among Air Traffic Controllers; 
(e) to protect and safeguard the interests of the Air Traffic Control 
profession; 
(f) to makes mutual benefit affiliations with other Air Traffic Con-
trollers organizations and international professional organiza-
tions; and 
(g) to strive for a world-wide Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' 
A . . 32 ssociations. 
These objectives are, as a group, impressive and of the utmost im-
portance in the realm of air safety and professionalism. It is, though, 
important to realize that IFATCA is composed, primarily, of trade unions 
and associations which are, in turn, composed of individual air traffic 
controllers. IFATCA is, then, a union of unions. Unions, characteris-
tically, are organized to promote the walfare and general interests of 
their composite members. IFATCA is no different. Being an internation-
al union of air traffic controllers, their primary interest should be, 
and is, the promotion of the wants and needs of the air traffic control-
lers it professes t o represent. As such, it would appear that objective 
E, as set for t h i n the IFATCA Manual, "to protect and safeguard the in-
32IFATCA Manua l , (Geneva, Switzerland: IFATCA, 1980-1981), p. 1213. 
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terests of the Air Traffic Control Profession" is the over-riding ob-
jective and concern of IFATCA. How well IFATCA articulates this primary 
'ob jective, as well as its other objectives, can best be demonstrated by 
a study of individual cases. Such an analysis will be presented toward 
the end of this thesis. But first, we need to trace the origin and de-
velopment of IFATCA as an international organization. 
Origin 
IFATCA was founded October 20, 1961, in Amsterdam, Netherlands when 
eleven (11) representatives from their respective national air traffic 
controllers unions agreed upon, and signed into being, the Constitution, 
by-laws, and objectives of IFATCA. The founding fathers, of IFATCA, 
agreed to co-operate and co-ordinate activities in four (4) broad areas:
33 
(1) The parties bound themselves to promote, maintain and enhance the 
stature of the air traffic control profession and to develop and 
disseminate knowledge of the control of air traffic in all its 
phases and applications. 
(2) The parties bound themselves to co-operate with each other in all 
matters affecting their common professional interests. 
(3) The various national Associations bound themselves to inform the 
Federation on pertinent activities and to exchange with each 
other relevant information of common concern. 
33rbid., I FATCA Manual, 1980. Founders were: Roger Sadet, Belgium; Ottokar Schubert Austria; A.G.T. Nielsen, Denmark; F.A. Lehto, Finland; J , Flament, Fran~e; Hans w. Thau, Germany ; Valdimar Olafsson, ~celand; James E. Murphy , Ireland; Alfred Feltes, Luxembourg; !an Van Ginkel, Netherlands; o. Saeboe, Norway and Bernhard Ruthy, Switzerland. 
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(4) The Member Associations accepted the principle that the Federa-
tion should be represented at any international meeting, in addi-
tion to meetings of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion), which had under consideration matters associated with air 
navigation and in particular with air traffic control and that, 
where possible, an observer should be sent to such meetings. 34 
Even though the cohesion and co-ordination of the organization was pro-
posed in these goals, the general welfare of the individual air traf-
fie controller was still the over-riding concern of IFATCA. This con-
cern was aptly stated in their professional journal in this way: "The 
particular nature of the work of an air traffic controller, and the in-
ternational character of the air traffic controllers profession (is what) 
impelled the national controllers' associations to join forces in an in-
. 1 . . .,35 ternationa organization. 
Originally, and especially due to the character of the founding 
membership, the founder members envisioned the organization as solely a 
European one. This was a short-lived notion as the founders realized 
the importance of expanding the parameters of membership to encompass 
the entire air traffic control community. By the time the organization 
developed its charter, the "aim (of the organization) became world-wide 
and membership open to all Associations 
"36 The founders realized 
34Ibid., pp. 1101-1102. 
35 · s t ry of IFATCA, "IFATCA; An Introduc-Ted Bradshaw Executive ecre a tion to the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associ-
tions", The Controller 5 C 1981): 3 • 
36 . 
Ibid. 
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that a dilated membership, restricted to only European associations, 
would unnecessarily constrict the power and operating authority of the 
organization. 
Organizational Growth - Membership 
The outstanding and unique aspect of the organization of IFATCA 
lies in its dual membership. IFATCA, in terms of the composition of its 
membership, is a heterogeneous international NGO. Membership in the 
Federation consists of three diverse categories: 
(1) Professional - comprised of Member Associat~ons, the individual 
members of which shall be considered as individual members of 
the Federation; 
(2) Associate Professional - comprised of those individuals who are 
unable to qualify for Professional membership through a Member 
association; and 
(3) Corporate - forming the supporting membership. These members are 
comprised of trade associations (private enterprises, MNCs who 
wish to join and, because of their product-line, have some vested 
. . 37 interest in air navigation. 
The unique diversity of membership, within the Federation, consists of 
the inclusion of corporate associations within its rank-and-file. This 
amalgamation of labor unions and trade associations, within one organi-
zation, deviates markedly from the international "norm" of NGOs, making 
IFATCA stand out, as an international organization. This unique struc-
37 IFATCA Manual , p. 1221. 
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ture, of its own volition, warrants further investigation. 
The largest number of members in the organization fall under the 
category of "professional" membership. Professional members are eligi-
ble for affiliation if the proposed organization's membership is of air 
traffic control personnel, and if the organization's technical objec-
tives are ess·entially the same as those of the Federation. The pro-
posed organization must prove to the Directors of IFATCA that it actu-
ally represents, or has the possibility to represent, a majority of the 
air traffic controllers within its area of representation. This re-
quirement is of the utmost concern to IFATCA, as this requisite auto-
matically accords de facto legitimacy to IFATCA as a truly representa-
tive body of air traffic controllers. Finally, affiliation of a pros-
pective Member Associations is subject to approval by a two-thirds major-
. f n· 38 ity o the irectors. 
Associate professional memberships are awarded to eligible indi-
vidual air traffic controllers employed in areas where there is no possi-
M b A 
. . 39 bility of affiliation to the Federation through a em er ssoc1at1on. 
This type of membership further legitimizes the representative nature 
of IFATCA by opening its organization to all air traffic controllers. 
However, some restrictions are placed on Associate members. Most prom-
inent among these are the restrictions of o£fice ahd suffrage. As so-
ciate members, in accordance with Section 2.2.3 of the IFATCA Manual, 
38Ibid., pp. 1221-1222. 
39
Ibid. 
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cannot hold any elective office, or have any right to vote. 40 
Supporting membership is .conferred upon~ corporation, organization 
or institutions wishing to support the aims of the Federation. 41 As 
previously shown, this aspect of IFATCA's membership is both unique, 
internationally, and an intriguing provision of this NGO. As stated 
in the IFATCA Manual, acceptance of any prospective supporting member 
is subject to approval of the Executive Board. 42 Because of the possi-
bility of special interest pressure, on the part of the corporate mem-
bers, being brought to bear upon the air traffic controllers, IFATCA 
inserted an ex ante provision into Section 2.2.3 of the Supporting Mem-
ber requisites in the IFATCA Manual. The provision, in effect a dis-
claimer, is worded as such: "Acceptance of Corporate Members does not 
bind the Federation to favor certain technical developments, unless 
caused to do so by unprejudiced professional judgment in rhe interest 
of safe and efficient air navigation."
43 
This provision would, then, 
seem to annul the possibility of special-interest politicking on the 
part of the corporate members. 
All three types of members are incorporated under the same group 
f · These "obligations" are six in number: o membership requirements. 
(1) members shall uphold the Constitution, Convention and By-laws; 
(2) each Member Association will act indepen-in national respects 
40
Ibid. 
41
Ibid. 
42
Ibid, , p. 1223. 
43 . 
Ibid. 
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dently; (As I will present in the PATCO case study, in the con-
cluding segment of this thesis, this obligation was dismissed 
and, indeed, abrogated.). 
(3) each Member Association must make a declaration of professional 
membership, yearly, within four weeks of the first of November; 
(4) Member Associations must appoint one of its professional members 
as its delegated representative, and the name of this Director 
shall be given to the Executive Secretary; 
(5) Member Associations, as well as its individual members, shall not 
engage in any action detrimental to the common interest and pub-
lie recognition of the profession; and 
(6) Associate Members should, as much as possible, support and publi-
cize the Federation and conduct themselves in the same manner as 
. f M A . . 44 i they belonged to a ember ssociation. 
In summation, it is worthwhile to point out that these criteria are some-
what amorphous and general. Despite this, these criteria are specific 
enough to guide the actions of the members. However, as will be shown, 
various member associations acted contrary to these obligations. 
Finally, I would like to turn to an examination of the organization-
al growth of IFATCA. In tracing membership growth, we need to distin-
guish two aspects of the of the membership: nations and corporations. 
Nations 
Previously, 1 alluded to the first organizational meeting of IFATCA 
441 . bid. 
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in Amsterdam, in late 1961. The twelve founder members of IFATCA are 
shown in Table I. 
Table I. Founding Members of IFATCA, by nationa 
Austria France Luxembourg 
Belgium Germany Netherlands 
Denmark Iceland Norway 
Finland Ireland Switzerland 
a IFATCA Manual, 1980, p. 5231. 
Notable among these founding members is the regional similarity of 
nations. This reflects the fact that the founders of IFATCA initially 
envisioned a strictly European organization. However, before IFATCA 
became a formalized agency the membership requirement and character of 
the organization became deregionalized although the European slant of 
the organization, as shown in Table I, is quite apparent in viewing its 
founder membership. 
As shown in Figure II, on the ensuing page, the growth in national 
union membership has been quite healthy since IFATCA's inception. In 
fact, in just over twenty years IFATCA has grown over 400%, or by 52 
members, in real terms. In viewing the individual member organizations, 
it becomes readily apparent that the European character of IFATCA soon 
dissipated with the incorporation of new members. Thus, with the excep-
tional growth of IFATCA, coupled with its transnational character, has 
come added power and prestige in the international environment. 
28 
YEAR 
NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES 
1961 
12 
1964 
19 
1967 
23 
1970 
31 
1973 
37 
1976 
44 
1979 
51 
1982b 
64 
Figure II. Increase of the IFATCA Union Membership: 1961 - l982a 
a IFATCA Manual, 1980, pp. 5231 - 5232. 
b Proposed affiliation to be decided at the 1982 Conference in Amsterdam. 
Corporations 
Corporate membership is both an unusual and important component of 
IFATCA. Growth in corporate membership has equaled that of union mem-
bership, although the first corporate member joined IFATCA in 1962, one 
year after the organization's inception. 
Many interesting facts emerge when the data in Figure III is further 
examined. First, Corporate membership has grown over 1300% in less than 
twenty years , or by 39 corporations, in real terms. Second, the major-
ity of Corporate members have their regional headquarters in four major 
countries. Thirty-three (33) of the 42 Corporate members are located in 
these four countries, or 79% of all such members. The four countries, 
along with their respective percentages, are shown in Table II. 
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YEAR 
NUMBER OF CORPORATE MEMBERS 
1962 
3 
1965 
6 
1968 
11 
1974 
14 
1977 
28 
1981 
42 
Figure III. Increase in the IFATCA Corporate Membership: 1962 _ l981a 
a 
IFATCA Manual, 1980, pp. 5233 - 5234. 
Table II. Major Corporate Countriesa 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF CORPORATIONS PERCENTAGES 
United Kingdom 9 22 
Germany (West) 6 14 
USA 11 26 
France 7 17 
a IFATCA Manual, 1980, pp. 5241 - ·5242. 
A few dominant characteristics are also apparent when viewing Table II. 
First, three of the four countries are European, renewing the European 
"flavor" initially envisioned for IFATCA by its founders. Second, all 
four nations are of the industrialized regions in the developed north. 
Although this fact merely reflects the reality of the modern economic 
market-place, it is still an interesting statistic. 
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Structure - Governing Organizations 
The day-to- day business and operation of IFATCA is accomplished 
through a body of centralized Executive Board and ten regional vice-
presiden~s. These officers are elected through the Annual Conference, 
held every year, in different locations. Although host-cities have re-
peated their role as an annual venue, the location of the annual con-
ference has been moved to different member countries, as a matter of 
course. This shift, in annual venue, has seemed to further strengthen 
the links between the national unions, and IFATCA, through close con-
tact. 
The Executive Board, which now meets at least four times per year 
to elect officers and rectify problems and policies before the organiza-
tion, is composed of five officers~ 
(1) President 
(2) Vice-President Administration 
(3) Vice-President Technical 
(4) Vice-President Professional 
(5) Treasurer. 
IFATCA, as wi t h most other organizations, has dealt with its more 
complex problems by forming standing committees• These committees are 
f th designated country. manned and operat ed by controllers o e The fol-
with their respective charge, lowing are the seven s t anding committees, 
and cotmtri es. 
~: S.C. I 
i': S. C. II 
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Technical and Professional Matters - United Kingdom 
Publications and Public Relations - France 
~·: S. C. III Finance - Switzerland 
* S.C. IV 
* s.c. v 
Environmental and Human Factors in Air Traffic Control -
West Germany, Netherl d B 1 · an s, e giurn, France and Switzer-
land. 
Recruitment and Training of Air Traffic Controllers -
Eurocontrol Guild, Denmark, New Zealand and the Nether-
lands. 
* S.C. VI Constitution and Administrative Policy - Canada. 
~': S.C. VII Legal Matters in Air Traffic Control - Egypt, Bahamas, 
Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Switzerland. 
IFATCA's standing committee structure is important in the formula-
tion and implementation of policies and procedures for both IFATCA and 
air traffic control. These standing committees allow the expertise in-
herent in national air traffic controller unions to be utilized through 
a committee structure. The various committees also strengthened the bonds 
(links) between these national air traffic controller unions, and be-
tween the individual national air traffic controller unions and IFATCA. 
A unique regional organization is encompassed in IFATCA's govern-
mental structure. IFATCA structured their government to encompass these 
regions in order to better formulate general policy. Ted Bradshaw, Ex-
ecutive Secretary of I FAT CA, has stated, " ••• experience has proved 
that our general policy, particularly in the technical field needed to 
be supplemented by procedures applicable to particular regions of the 
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world. To meet these requirements, ten reg'ons 
L were formed and each now 
has its Vice-President and advisors respons'ble f 
L or the organization of 
affairs, within the region."45 T 
hese ten regions, along with their 
current Vice-Presidents, are: 
(1) North and Central America - Carlos Olmos M. (Mexico) 
(2) South America - M. Salazar (Venezuela) 
(3) Caribbean - Richard Greene (Bahamas) 
(4) Pacific - Robin Saar (New Zealand) 
(5) Asia - G.W. Smith (Hong Kong) 
(6) Middle East and Mediterranean - Petros Georgis (Cyprus) 
(7) Central and Eastern Europe - W. Schindler (Austria) 
(8) Western Europe - Bjarne Nilssen (Norway) 
(9) Africa East - Ralph Kimilu (Nairobi) 
46 (10) Africa West - D.E.Y. Klaye (Ghana). 
These regional Vice-Presidents are elected on a much different sys-
tern than the Executive Board. All 61 member countries are divided into 
the above ten regions. Every year, five of the regional Vice-Presidents 
are elected for two-year terms, on the following rotational formula: 
EVEN years: EUR PAC MID AFE SAM 
ODD years: CEN ASI CAR AFW NCA. 
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Nominations and elections are conducted within the regional di vi-
sions. These regional Vice-Presidents are elected by a simple majority 
45Ted Bradshaw' "IFATCA; An Introduction": 3 • 
46 
IFATCA Manual, p. 2861. 
47 
Ibid., p. 2821. 
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vote of the Directors representing the nations in the respective region.48 
The IFATCA Manual is very explicit in connoting the responsibilities of 
the regional Vice-President. These responsibilities, which are four in 
number, constitute the following: 
(1) to represent Member Associations national problems; 
(2) to interpret Executive Council decisions to his Member Associa-
tions and ensuring IFATCA policy is adhered to in his region; 
(3) to submit written reports as per Article VII, paragraph 3.2 of 
the Constitution; and 
(4) to attend all Executive Council meetings and Conferences. 49 
As with the standing committees, this regional breakdown aids in 
strengthening the links between different unions and between the unions 
and IFATCA. The standing committees and the regional vice-presidents 
help to build a corner-stone of operating authority for IFATCA. This 
corner-stone of power sets apart IFATCA from the "run-of-the-mill" NGO, 
which is typically weak and ineffective in reaching the goals of its 
membership. This is not to say that IFATCA, as a result of its g~verning 
structure, can reach all of its goals. IFATCA still has many of the 
short-comings and weaknesses inherent in typical NGOs. However, IFATCA 
does i ncorpora t e a greater degree of operating authority, within its 
ranks, due to its s tandin g committee, and regional structure. 
I n s ummary , I FATCA's governing structure can be best characterized 
as a weak Federa l s ys tem . 
48
Ibid. 
49 
Ibid ., p . 2731. 
IFATCA's main decision-making body, the Exec-
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utive Board,· centralizes most of the power of this NGO within its of-
fice . The regional units are given small amounts f o power, in order to 
supplement and adapt general IFATCA policy to the specific needs of the 
region. 
Publications 
IFATCA provides publications to its members and other individuals 
interested in the field of air traffic control. Ted Bradshaw, as Exec-
utive Secretary, co-ordinates the publication _of IFATCA ' .s two circuiars, 
The Controller and the IFATCA Circular. IFATCA feels the publication 
of these two journals is of utmost importance to the organization. This 
view is also held by Bradshaw, as is shown by this passage: "In order 
to maintain close contact with the Member Associations, with other ATC 
(air traffic control) organizations which are interested in the Federa-
tion, with the Corporate Members, and with the public, IFATCA publishes 
quarterly a Journal of Air Traffic Control: The Controller, and a bi-
monthly IFATCA Circular." 
'7he Controller treats all aspects of Air Traffic Control, with 
particular emphasis on new advances in ATC and the human elements in 
this highly sophisticated environment· At the same time, it represents 
Corporation Members for discussing the a mouth-piece of service to the 
1 developments in the field of air traffic atest technical and methodical 
safety ," 
1 Publication, mainly concerned "The IFATCA Circular is an interna 
Associations worth to be known With news from the Federation and Member 
by all Member Associations ·" 
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"Urgent matte f f rs 0 su ficient importance to be made known immedi-
ately to all Member associations are communicated by Special Newslet-
50 ters." 
These publications are excellent methods of establishing and solid-
ifying links among and between the national ATC unions. Under Rosenau's 
theory of linkage, these publications constitute polity and environmen-
tal outputs· Whether other unions act upon thes outputs, contained in 
these publications, determines the quality and quantity of links fostered 
by these publications. 
The role of IFATCA's two publications is deemed, by this organiza-
tion, as one of continuity. Not only do these publications try to in-
form and educate a ir traffic controllers to new and modern innovations 
in their field, but t hese two journals provide a forum for the Corporate 
Members to display their "wares". However, in assessing the role of the 
Corporate Members in these publications, Mr. Bradshaw neglected to men-
tion t he role of advert ising. Interested individuals may purchase ad-
vertising space i n The Controller. Advertising, in this journal, is 
cert ainly an added advantage to the Corporate Members. The fact that 
Corporat e Members ma y ad vertise their equipment in The Controller seems, 
to this a uthor, t o be t r y ing a tenet of the IFATCA Constitution, Section 
2.2.3. This sect ion o f t h e Constitution, as quoted previously on page 
25, deals with poss ible con flicts of interest as regards the interaction 
The between the member cor porat ions, and the air traffic controller. 
Possibility tha t advertiseme n ts in ~ Controller might sway a controller 
SOTed Bradshaw, " IFATCA ; An Introduction"' pp. 4- 5 . 
36 
to a position of support, for use of a corporation's equipment, is in-creased with the advent of this advertisement. 
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CHAPTER III. 
A CASE STUDY OF THE PATCO STRIKE/WALK-OUT OF 1981 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have examined the theories behind this 
study, as well as a study of the organization. In this chapter, we will 
examine a case study of IFATCA as it dealt with a conflict issue. This 
study will tie together the previous chapters by showing IFATCA establish-
ing links in order to prosecute its goals, and policies, on issues. The 
case study of the PATCO conflict will demonstrate IFATCA's role in fur-
thering complex interdependence in the international environment. 
IFATCA's organizational character, as an NGO, will also be examined 
in this chapter. The success, or failure, of an NGO, in prosecuting 
its policies through linkage and regime-building, is an important topic 
in international relations research, and is a primary focal point in 
this work. 
The PATCO case study involves a national organization, the United 
States Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization, and its wage 
and benefit dispute with the United States Government, PATCO's employer. 
The PATCO Union is an organization composed of the majority of air traf-
fic controllers working throughout the United States. PATCO, which had 
the sole bargaining power for United States controllers vis-a-vis the 
United States Government, was affiliated with the AFL-CIO, a national 
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organization of separate worker's unions. 
History 
In early June of 1981, after almost fourteen months of negotiation, 
a tentative contract was reached between PATCO, through President Robert 
E. Poli (of PATCO), and Department of Transportatio~ Secretary Drew 
L . 51 Th" ew1s. is contract, which would become active after being ratified 
by at least an 807. vote of all PATCO members, contained the following 
provisions (Figure IV, on the following page). 
Upon returning the contract to the Union, Poli found support had 
dwindled for the proposed document. PATCO union members subsequently 
voted down the proposed measures. 
Poli was again sent back with new demands for wage and benefit in-
creases. PATCO union members demanded the following contractural mea-
sures (see Figure V, on page 41). The Federal Government deemed these 
new demands excessive and unreasonable. Negotiations between PATCO, and 
the Federal Government, ceased, a situation which lasted all of June and 
most of July. 
On July 30, 1981, talks again were renewed between PATCO and the 
Federal Government. In an effort to close the negotiations as soon as 
possible, the Federal Government called in a special mediator, Kenneth 
E. Moffet. 52 When the talks resumed, on that Friday, Poli presented an 
ultimatum to Secretary Drew Lewis: come up with a new deal in the next 
three days, or PATCO would order all its controllers off the job. Lewis 
5 ~ew York Times, 1 August 1981, PP• 1 & 13. 
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(1) $40 Million total wage a d b f. n ene its package 
a. 42 hours of pay for every 40 hours of work 
b. 157. night differential pay instead of the then current 10% 
c. exemption of night, Sunday and holiday premium pay from the Gov-
ernment's legal limit of $50,112 on annual pay of Federal employ-
ees 
d. Increase in all pay levels, on the average, $2,300 per year over 
and above the $1,700 annual increase to all Federal employees. 
Current pay levels were: 
- $33,000 - fully qualified controllers 
- $20,500 - base for light-load traffic controllers 
- $50,000 - base for most experienced controllers. 
Figure IV. Tentative Contract: 
a 
June 1981 
~ew York Times, 1 August 1981, p. 13. 
called this new demand, and the PATCO contractural proposals "unfair", 
and stated the government stood firm on its previous $40 Million pro-
Posed contract. Kenneth Moffet, the special government mediator, summed 
up the conflict when he stated the two sides were "light-years apart", 
and that he saw little chance of agreement, in the allotted time.
53 
Little did both sides know, but Moffet had correctly assessed the intran-
sigence of both parties. 
53
Ibid. 
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(1) $700 Million total wage and benefit package 
a. 14 weeks of pay for retaining certai·n medically disqualified con-
trollers 
b. 32 hour work week 
c. $10,000 across-the-board wage increase 
d. Retirement after twenty-years of service, regardless of age. 
The previous contract called for retirement after 2S years or 
20 years at age SO. 
e. Retirement income must be 7S% of a controller's highest gross 
salary. The previous contract called for retirement income SOi. 
of the average base salary of the three years of highest pay. 
Figure V. PATCO Counter-demands: June l98la 
~ew York Times, 4 August 1981, pp. 1 & B8. --------
On Monday, August 3, at 7:00 AM (New York time), after all negotia-
tions had failed, PATCO staged its walk-out/strike.
54 
The Reagan Admin-
istration immediately tried to counter this move by proclaiming the 
walk-out "illegal" and in breach of the contracts the controllers signed 
upon initially being hired. President Reagan continued his statement to 
the press by setting a time-limit of his own - if the controllers didn't 
return to their jobs by 11:00 AM (New York time), Wednesday, August 5, 
the controllers would forfeit their jobs de facto. Furthermore, the 
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Ibid., 4 August, PP• 1 & B8. 
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Reagan Administration, acting through the Justice Department, began 
taking legal actions against the Union.SS First, in order to economi-
cally injure the strikers, the Justice Department impounded all of the 
$3.S million in strike funds which were to be used to supplement the 
incomes of the strikers. Next, the Justice Department reiterated the 
Reagan Administration's claim the strike was illegal, and in breach of 
contract, and would lead to the firing of all striking members. The 
Justice Department also claimed arrest and jail terms would ensue for 
many of the strikers. And, finally, the Justice Department ordered that 
President Robert Poli be held in contempt, and be fined $1000 per day, 
for each day of the strike.s6 Despite all the threats and penalties, it 
became increasingly obvious the controllers would not return to work on 
Wednesday, August S, the Reagan-imposed deadline. Just like clock-work, 
on Wednesday morning, President Reagan made good his pledge, and fired 
all striking controllers. 
Since August S, very little has occurred, on the national scene, 
in the struggle between PATCO and the Federal Government. On October 
22, 1981, the Federal Labor Relations Board (FLRB) stripped the PATCO 
Union of its action in calling the strike. This action by the FLRB, also 
stripped PATCO of its right to bargain for the controllers. This move 
by the FLRB, was the first such action against any union, and PATCO was 
the first union to ever loose its right as an exclusive bargaining agent 
for government employees.s 7 The PATCO strike/walk-out has never ended 
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42 
and the majority of PATCO employees have never returned to work. 
IFATCA Involvement 
Although PATCO officials still claim they never sequestered IFATCA 
for backing, or aid, IFATCA nevertheless became involved in PATCO's fate 
very early in the conflict. Specifically, IFATCA jumped into the midst 
of the conflict Thursday, August 6, only three days after the conflict 
began. Harri Henschler, President of IFATCA, asked its 60 member groups 
to deny clearance to aircraft flying to the United States, on this day. 
Henschler took the action for three reasons: 
(1) sympathy for the PATCO strikers; 
(2) air safety reasons - Henschler stated this was his major reason 
for calling this boycott; and 
(3) to protest controllers in other countries against legal liability 
in case of a crash. 
In sum, Henschler stated the military replacements were not trained to 
handle traffic at the airports, in which they were transferred, and that 
this was creating air safety problems.
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This initial .reaction by IFATCA, while only "a war of words" began 
to have serious over-tones to the conflict. First, IFATCA's intrusion 
into the situation transformed the issue from a national one, to one of 
international proportion. Second, IFATCA's announcement called upon 
60 national air traffic controllers groups to create boycotts, and thus 
controversies, within their respective countries. Thus, IFATCA had 
58
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"linked" a national conflict i· ssue to · international concerns. This in-
ternational concern was now linked to over 60 national organizations. 
Concurrent with this international action was the possibility of action 
in some, if not all, the 60 nations; action which was certain to cause 
controversy and conflict. However, whether the second link between 
IFATCA and the 60 member nations occurred would depend upon the strength, 
and vitality, of IFATCA as an organization. 
IFATCA's organizational unity proved strong, indeed. In London, 
the same day as the Henschler announcement, many of the European mem-
bers of IFATCA issued a statement affirming their support of PATCO. 
This statement, although not a strongly worded as Henschler's, asked 
other member associations to consider "refusing air traffic control ser-
vices to United States-registered aircraft ... 
59 
Some national air controller's groups used other methods to ex-
press their views. While both France and Denmark expressed sympathy 
for PATCO, Denmark controllers went one step further by formally asking 
President Reagan to cancel all job dismissal notices he had ordered is-
sued. The British controllers, in their own manner, followed the Dutch 
lead. Doug Bush, head of the British Institute of Professional Civil 
Servants (who represents Britain's 1,500 most senior air traffic con-
trollers) said, "Sorry, this is not the practice a 20th_ Century . natie.n 
should indulge in."60 However, despite all this, the only actions had 
consisted of words and statements. 
On the ensuing day, Friday, August 7, the IFATCA proclamation be-
59
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gan to acquire adherents. Air traffic controllers in Finland, Norway, 
Italy and France took varying degrees of action against United States-
aircraft, from rule-book slowdowns, to out-and-out refusals to handle 
American-bound flights. Air traffic controllers in Great Britain, 
Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany planned 
protests similar to those being staged by the above groups. 61 
The stiffest resistance came from the Canadian air traffic control-
lers. In Montreal, 80 flights to, and from, the United States were de-
layed for up to an hour by sympathetic controllers. In Toronto, the 
"second-link", previously alluded to, was connected, Because of their 
part in delaying flights, and also for refusing to clear flights to the 
United States, three Toronto controllers were suspended, without pay. 
The PATCO conflict had finally passed through its second-stage of link-
age and had begun to cause conflict, and tension, in a member country. 
Other Canadian controllers carried their protests outside the confines 
of the air traffic control tower, by picketing the United States Con-
62 
sulate, to protest the jailings of American controllers. 
IFATCA reasserted itself on this Friday. Henschler stated that 
the United States airspace was "unsafe' due to the replacement of 
controllers. IFATCA's Executive Secretary, Ted Bradshaw, in response 
to various criticisms of IFATCA's boycott directive, stated that the 
appeal t o not clear United States-flights was a recommendation, not a 
d . . 63 irecti. ve. 
61Ibid., 8 Augus t , P• 6. 
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It is in Bradshaw's statement that b we can egin to see the limita-
tions of IFATCA 's power. IFATCA NGO , as an , has no governmental powers; 
i.e. diplomatic, economic, political. IFATCA is an organization composed 
largely of professionals, who are employed by their respective govern-
ments. When these professionals ignore the wishes of their eID.Ployer, 
and use their position to protest events, the government-employer can 
terminate the errant controller. As such, IFATCA can scarcely ask a 
member controller, or his union, to forfeit their livelihood(s) to pro-
test events concerning other controllers, in other countries. 
One more "big event" would occur, on the international scene, which 
would allow IFATCA to flex its organizational "muscle". By Saturday, 
August 8, United States-flights in and out,. of Canada, were beginning 
to slow considerably, due to actions of controllers. Over 15% of all 
United States-flights were delayed one hour, or more. In addition, 
French and New Zealand controllers stated they would no longer clear 
flights to the United States. The Canadians, French and New Zealanders 
all claimed their actions were motivated by their belief that American 
64 
airspace, and military replacement controllers, were "unsafe"• 
Once again, the proclamations of a national controller's group went 
unheeded by the United States. The United States Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) emphatically denied the Canadian claims and stated 
65 
United States airspace was operating as usual. In response, the 
· t. (CATCA) moved to a total boy-Canadian Air Traffic Control Associa ion 
cott of all incoming, and outgoing, flights. This boycott began late 
64I . bid., 
65
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Sunday night, August 9, 1981. 66 CATCA instituted their boycott, citing 
"unsafe" controller operations, and backing up their claims with 41 doc-
umented cases of near-incidents, in Canadian airspace, since the begin-
ning of the PATCO walk-out.
67 
This move, by CATCA, most certainly in 
deference to the wishes of IFATCA, placed CATCA at odds with Transport 
Canada, the Canadian counter-part of the FAA. Canadian Transportation 
Minister Jean-Luc Pepin, in addressing this new crisis, threatened to 
dismiss, fine and jail all controllers that refused to handle United-
States-flights. 68 CATCA, despite these threats, continued the boycott. 
Meanwhile, the CATCA boycott was creating quite a few difficulties 
in the United States (see Maps 1 & 2 on the following page). Of utmost 
concern, the CATCA boycott closed the "normal" air-route to Europe, an 
air-route which provided more safety, and a much quicker trip, to con-
tinental Europe, for United States airlines (see Map 2, the heaviest 
black line). The United States FAA had to immediately work out new 
d
. 69 
flight paths, ones which steered clear of the boycotted Cana ian zone. 
These new flight paths, with the exception of the southern-most route, 
traveled over no land masses and were much longer, in terms of air time, 
than the boycotted "normal" route• 
By the time of the CATCA strike, the "linkage" character of the 
P "f 11 i·rcle" As you will recall, the ATCO conflict had gone almost u -c • 
PATCO national conflict took on international characteristics when IFATCA 
66Ibid., 10 August, PP• 1 & DlO. 
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Map 1. 
. a 
Control Areas Over the Atlantic 
~ew York Times, 9 August 1 981, p . 22 . 
Map 2. a 
Typical Trans-Atlantic Air Routes : United States to Europe 
~ew ~Times, 11 August 1 981 , p . 1 . 
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spoke out on the issue, and stringently requested a world-wide boycott 
of all United States-flights. IFATCA had thus linked a national conflict 
with international concerns (see Graph I, on the following page). The 
various national members, CATCA being the most noteworthy, took up this 
call to action, by IFATCA, and thus linked a national union, utilizing 
indigenous resources, to international concerns; those concerns of the 
PATCO strike and of "unsafe" air traffic control conditions within the 
United States. This action, by CATCA, created a conflict, in Canada, be-
tween CATCA and their employer, the Canadian Government; a conflict rem-
iniscent of the PATCO - United States Goverrunent conflict. So, in es-
sence, through the vestige of IFATCA, a national conflict, in the United 
States, had been expanded to other nations, especially Canada. This 
action, by IFATCA, poignantly displays the parameters of "complex in-
terdependence" in the international community. However, the boycott, by 
CATCA, did not complete the "full-circle" effect of linkage as it re-
lated to this issue. 
Just two days after CATCA began its boycott, the Canadian Govern-
ment acquiesced to CATCA demands, and thereby brought the boycott to a 
A t 12 
70 Specifically, CATCA and the conclusion, on Wednesday, ugus • 
Canadian Government agreed to enter into a joint inquiry into the PATCO 
walk-out, and the complimentary issue of air safety, as it pertained to 
American flights.71 The joint agreement, between CATCA and the Canadian 
f the PATCO issue (see Graph Government, completed the cyclical path 0 
I), Not only had a national conflict been transmitted to another na-
701 . bid. , 
71
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Graph I . The Cyclical Nature of the PATCO Conflict 
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so 
tion, but one government had acquiesced to revi.· ew the domestic actions 
and policies of another ogvernment, a rare occurrence especially con-
sidering this action was directed at the United States. IFATCA, in this 
one issue, had strengthened the ligatures of "linkage", that it laid 
claim to, and had solidified the concept of "complex interdependence", 
in the international community. 
Various other international organizations became involved, of their 
own volition, in the PATCO issue. Most notable among these was the In-
ternational Air Transport Association (IATA), an organization which 
represents most international airlines. On August 12, IATA released a 
scathing denunciation of IFATCA, indirectly, and the PATCO action direct-
ly. In addressing IFATCA, IATA proclaimed that the foreign controllers 
have "insufficient information on which to base negative judgments on 
the safety" of the air traffic control system then operating in the 
United States. IATA further urged foreign controllers to "decide on the 
extent of their loyalty to their own administrations (whether to boycott, 
or not)." This pronouncement was a direct slap in the face of IFATCA, 
who had vehemently claimed -United States airspace was "unsafe", and that 
. h 72 
foreign controllers should boycott United States-fll.g ts· 
IATA was equally fervent in condemning PATCO's action. IATA claimed 
the 12,000 American controllers had grievously erred in their walk-
out, a walk-out which IATA stated breached a pledge all American con-
trollers had made when they were originally hired• IATA summed up its 
Control lers had "defied the law and ig-Position by stating the American 
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nored commitments freely entered into. ,,73 Basically, IATA became linked 
to the PATCO issue because _of the ramifications of IFATCA • s call to 
boycott. This issue-linkage, between two international organizations, 
is yet another example of linkage and complex international interdepen-
dence. 
At this juncture, IFATCA needed to formulate a new direction, or 
at least a solid position, vis-a-vis the PATCO issue. On Thursday, 
Aµgust 14, IFATCA entered into an Emergency Board Meeting, in Amsterdam, 
74 to determine the direction of action to be taken. After this meeting, 
IFATCA President Harri Henschler announced IFATCA would rescind its call 
for boycotts, and other such actions, but would issue a strong appeal, 
to President Reagan, to resume talks with PATCO. In order to allow 
Reagan time to comply with this appeal, and to formulate a new set of 
actions if Reagan refused, IFATCA scheduled another Emergency Board 
75 Meeting for August 22. 
With this pronouncement, came also the realization that IFATCA had 
extended, to an apex, its authority and influence in linking, and build-
ing, international regimes around these links• This became painfully 
obvious in an interview, conducted with IFATCA President Henschler, after 
the August 14 Board Meeting, in which he stated, "We still feel it is 
best, at this time, to attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement, if 
you will, as speedily as possible· 
we did not think the escalation (of 
boycotts, etc.) would be helpful at this time." 
This statement, by 
73I . bid. , 13 August, P• D22. 
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Henschler, if examined in detail, proves IFATCA had extended its power, 
in the PATCO issue as far as was poss1· ble. F · t d irs , an most obvious, is 
the statement concerning "escalation" of possible action( s), against the 
United States Government. Demand· ld "d ing wor -w1 e boycotts was the extent 
of possible action IFATCA could bring against the United States Govern-
ment; an action which had already been taken. In addition, the Reagan 
Administration's consistent refusal to enter into negotiations, with 
the striking controllers, ensured that no agreement would be arranged 
between the two parties. Henschler merely minced words when he _ expressed 
hopes the issue would be speedily, and peacefully, ended. 
Shortly thereafter, in another interview, Ted Bradshaw, the Exec-
utive Secretary for IFATCA, displayed IFATCA' s impotence in the PATCO 
issue. Mr . Bradshaw stated that foreign controllers might "get in trou-
ble with their own governments" if they boycotted flights to the United 
States, and the organization would not "encourage any of our members to 
break the law", Likewise, he said, IFATCA has not taken a position on 
. 76 
whether it was right, for the American controllers, to strike• This 
impotence is characteristic of NGOs which, as such, have no legal govern-
mental sovereignty. Thus, while IFATCA did link together various nation-
al organizations over one particular issue, it was impotent in solidify-
ing those links' and bringing about a conclusion to the conflict• 
The Emergency Board Meeting, of August 22 
77 
drew the true parameters of this impotence· 
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(Saturday), in Amsterdam, 
It was at this meeting 
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that IFATCA agreed to back PATCO, in its strike, with "labor action". 78 
These "labor actions", while sounding quite impressive (as well as some-
what threatening), remained unspecifically defined. IFATCA issued no 
calls to direct action, despite the refusal of the Reagan Administration 
to renew talks with PATCO. The only positive statements issued by IFATCA 
were further appeals, to the Reagan Administration, to renew talks with 
PATCO. IFATCA also made an offer to both parties to act as a third-
ed . . 79 B party m iator-negotiator. oth of these requests went unheeded, in 
Washington. 
After the Emergency Board Meeting, of August 22, IFATCA interest, 
and participation, i n the PATCO strike diminished. Basically, the 
Reagan Administration had "called IFATCA' s bluff, the "bluff" being 
that IFATCA could actually construct a world-wide boycott that would 
cripple, or even halt, United States-flights overseas. As was seen, by 
Ted Bradshaw's remarks of August 20th (see page 39), IFATCA was indeed 
bluffing when it first proposed a world-wide boycott of United States-
flights. The actual operating authority of IFATCA was simply not enough 
to stage such an action. 
· i·n i·ts unconscious, second-This is not to say IFATCA was ineffective 
In ary role, as an agent of international linkage and regime-building• 
fact, as noted, IFATCA was quite effective as an agent of linkage (see 
G h I IFATCA was able to link a nation-based conflict, rap , page 45). 
With other national organizations' havl.
·ng similar international concerns. 
Then' as Contr
a llers organization brought a concerned CATCA, a national 
78 
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great deal of conflict into their own country, by responding to the 
PATCO issue by boycotting• Finally, CATCA, in conjunction with the 
Canadian Government, entered into an agreement to study the PATCO issue, 
linking (in effect) two nations over the issue of a union strike. Basic-
ally, through IFATCA' s efforts, a great deal of international attention 
and action was linked to this national issue. In sum, the PATCO con-
troversy is a "classic" case to demonstrate the working of "internation-
al linkage", and "complex interdependence", in the air. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In order to fully understand the importance of IFATCA, in interna-
tional aviation, one must comprehend the theories of linkage and complex 
interdependence. Of all international issues, aviation demands the high-
est quality, and quantity, of links • The need for interdependence, in 
international aviation, is critical to the safety and well-being of both 
the airlines, and its customers. Nations which engage in international 
air transport must establish international regimes to standardize norms, 
and rules, of air transport. 
The importance of building international regimes, around the issue 
of air traffic control, is equally critical for safety and welfare• 
Norms and rules have been standardized, on an international level, and 
will continue to be so handled. Just as important, in this area of in-
t f th l.. ndividual air traf-ernational aviation, is the general welfare o e 
fie controller. The profession of air traffic controller has long been 
recognized as one which greatly taxes the mental, and physical, process-
es of the worker. As such, 
special considerations, rules and conditions 
of employment have been accorded this profession• 
Such benefits as high 
P f absence, have become normal ay, large disability payments and leaves o 
contractural arrangements for controllers• 
and special needs, of 
IFATCA was formed to prosecute these wants, 
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the air traffic control profession. A h · s s own, since IFATCA is an NGO, 
it has a weak power base from which to prosecute issues and conflicts. 
In order to build a power base around an issue, IFATCA must build an 
issue-regime around the issue. The regime, in order to be effective, 
must be structured well, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Since 
the majority of member unions are employed by their respective govern-
ments, these unions have a restricted quantity, and quality, of actions 
they may take, on any given issue, to bolster the regime. In the case 
of the CATCA boycott, some Canadian controllers were suspended, and the 
rest were threatened with firing and imprisonment. While prosecuting 
any given issue, IFATCA must be careful to not demand, or even request, 
any actions which will place any of its member associations in direct 
conflict with their respective employers. Such was almost the case 
with the ' IFATC4 Tequest .to boyc:ott United States-flights, during the 
PATCO strike. 
Needless to say, IFATCA sees bright future for itself in a world 
which is becoming increasingly more interdependence• The international 
character of the job, of air traffic controller, further aggrandizes the 
"linkage-ability" of IFATCA, in the international community. Because of 
h a ;r traff;c controllers, issue-linkage and t e nature of the position of ... ... 
's fac'l;tated much more readily by IFATCA, regime-building on ATC issues ... ... ... 
than with most organizations. 
The PATCO case study does show that IFATCA, through a simple re-
attention at a national conflict, quest, was able to direct international 
with the broader international and link this nation-based conflict issue 
issue of general controller's welfare. 
IFATCA was able to build a re-
57. 
gime with which to prosecute the issue, despite the fact that the regime 
was somewhat shaky, and lasted for but a short period of time (see Graph 
I, page SOb). The regime was able to pose problems and dilemmas in the 
conflict, and was most certainly felt by policy-makers in the United 
States Government. Although IFATCA was unable to bring a satisfactory 
conclusion to the conflict, it was able to make its presence known, es-
pecially through the various boycotts, and re-routing schemes, that the 
FAA had to administer, in response to the boycotts. 
In summary, IFATCA seems to possess a great deal of power, and 
authority, as an NGO. Through simple requests, IFATCA is able to com-
mand controllers to take actions detrimental to their individual job 
situations, and economic welfares. IFATCA, as such, is an agent of link-
age and regime-building, in the international arena, and is able to 
build substantial prosecutorial regimes. The future of IFATCA, in the 
new international community of expanding air networks, appears to be 
bright, indeed, 
. 58 
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